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Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges
Facing the Oil & Gas Industry
By Don C. Smith and Jessica M. Richards*

Abstract
The crossroads of urban development and improved technology allowing oil and gas development in new
areas can result in contentious community issues. The debate over one of the improved technologies – i.e.,
hydraulic fracturing – can be highly emotional. Consequently, industry must address community issues,
earning trust and therefore a “social license to operate.” This paper provides fundamental knowledge of
the social license to operate concept, validates its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly with
respect to shale gas development, discusses the current status of social license in the unconventional
development sphere, analyzes current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a
social license, and identifies potential new methods of encouraging, establishing, and monitoring a social
license to operate. The paper also proposes a new institutional framework in which to promote the social
license to operate, “The Center for Social License to Operate in the Oil & Gas Industry.”

I. Introduction
Within the past decade, two key technologies have dramatically changed the landscape of oil and gas
development, in turn drawing a great deal of attention to the “Shale Revolution”: horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing.1 These technologies, coupled with population growth and urban sprawl, have
attracted a great deal of scrutiny to shale development. These technologic breakthroughs have also led to
a paradigm shift in energy scholarship. Many shale resources that were previously considered
unrecoverable are now economically recoverable. Interestingly enough, a significant portion of these
shale resources encroach upon urban developments. As many as 300 million people around the world
across six continents occupy land overlying a shale reservoir.2 Large-scale industrial extraction of shale
will no doubt impact these urban developments. Whether or not the impacts will be positive or negative
for these local communities largely rests with industry’s approach to development.3
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Nathan Richardson, et. al., The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 3 (June 2013) available
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2
Thomas G. Measham, David A. Fleming, Correspondence: Assess Benefits and Costs of Shale Energy, 50 NATURE
473 (June 26, 2014).
3
Id.
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The oil and gas exploration and production processes are increasingly the topic of discussion in
the media, and not always with positive connotation. In the United States, a 2012 Gallup Poll reported
that almost two-thirds of Americans have a negative view of the oil and gas industry.5 A newspaper in the
heart of shale development in Colorado went so far to say the “process of hydraulic fracturing for oil and
gas is perhaps one of the most misunderstood drilling practices, becoming as bad of a word in some
circles as a racial slur.”6 Moreover, some local communities have taken matters in to their own hands,
going so far as suspending or banning hydraulic fracturing activities within city limits.7
Around the world, resistance from local communities continues to threaten shale development.
Shale resources often go undeveloped, not for the lack of a legal license, but rather for the lack of a social
license.8 Many local communities express concerns about the impacts of shale development including
ground and surface water protection, air quality, and increased traffic, dust, and noise.9 However,
“popular concerns about potential hazards to personal health and safety are often inconsistent with
4

Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41
Countries Outside the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/.
5
Rachael Seeley, Shale’s social license, OIL & GAS JOURNAL 16 (July 21, 2014).
6
Sharon Dunn, Fracking 101: Breaking Down the Most Important Part of Today’s Oil, Gas Drilling, THE GREELEY
TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/9558384-113/drilling-oil-equipmentwellbore.
7
Clifford Kraus, Split Decision by Voters on Local Fracking Bans, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/business/energy-environment/split-decision-by-voters-on-localfracking-bans-.html?_r=0.
8
Interview by Stephanie Joyce with Alex Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko Petroleum, in
Relationships 101: Oil and Gas Looks for a Social License to Operate, WYOMING PUBLIC RADIO (Dec., 5 2014),
available at https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license-to-operate/.
9
CNEE Powering Forward Full Report, CENTER FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY, COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY
92, available at http://cnee.colostate.edu/graphics/uploads/CNEE-Powering-Forward-Full-Report.pdf.
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scientific evidence regarding the probability or risk that such hazards will actually happen.”10 Regardless
of whether the hazards are probable, the mere presence of potential hazards creates a stigma of harm.11 A
stigma of harm, whether founded in fact, fiction, or emotion, must be addressed by companies wishing to
explore for and develop shale resources.
In an effort to address the impacts of shale development on local communities, several energy
development scholars recommend that operators obtain a “social license to operate” in communities near
extractive industry projects. The process of obtaining a social license to operate includes, among other
things, early as well as ongoing communication with communities, transparency and engagement in
decision-making, and the establishment of effective conflict resolution mechanisms.12 While the concept
of social license to operate emerged from and evolved to become a standard business practice in the
mining industry over the past nearly two decades, the concept of social license to operate is in its infancy
in the oil and gas industry. This paper seeks to provide fundamental knowledge about “social license to
operate,” validate its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly shale gas development, discuss
current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a social licenses, and identify
potential shale gas industry practices to earn a social license to operate.
IMPACTS OF NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, natural gas has emerged as the preferred fossil fuel to bridge the gap between fossil fuel
dependence and renewable energy. Natural gas has a wide variety of uses for residential use, commercial
use, electricity generation, industrial use, and vehicle fuel.13 When compared to other fossil fuels, natural
gas is considered cleaner because it releases fewer harmful pollutants.14 It has been dubbed the most
environmentally friendly and the “cleanest” fossil fuel.15 For example, natural gas combustion releases
approximately half as much carbon dioxide as coal and 30 percent less carbon dioxide than oil, and
significantly fewer pollutants per unit of energy.16 Moreover, natural gas emits 15 to 20 percent less heattrapping gases than gasoline when burned in vehicles.17
However, the natural gas exploration, drilling, production, and consumption processes are not
without an environmental footprint. Critics note that the drilling and producing processes can contaminate
groundwater, release air pollution including methane, disrupt wildlife habitats and negatively impact local
communities.18 Natural gas emissions occur during both the production process and the combustion, or
consumption, process. In the U.S., natural gas production process results in venting or flaring of other
fugitive methane releases, attributable to approximately two percent of total emissions, while natural gas
combustion process causes approximately 21 percent of annual greenhouse gas emissions. Globally,
natural gas combustion in 2011 accounted for 20.2 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions

10

Ian Thomson, Understanding and Managing Public Reaction to ‘Fracking’, 33 J. OF ENERGY & NATURAL RES.
LAW (2015).
11
Id.
12
Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the origins of “social license to operate” in the mining sector:
Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories, 37 RESOURCES POLICY 346, 347 (2012).
13
Why is Natural Gas a Better Fossil Fuel?, INNOVATEUS, http://www.innovateus.net/climate/why-natural-gasbetter-fossil-fuel.
14
Natural Gas, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/energy/source/natural-gas.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas: Global Warming Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impacts-ofnatural-gas.html#.VRbQdk10yUk.
18
Nathan Richardson, et.al., supra note 1, at 5.
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attributable to production and consumption of fossil fuels.19 It is important to note that natural gas
extraction and transportation processes results in methane release, which is different from carbon dioxide
release and is considered by many to be a more potent global warming gas than carbon dioxide.20 21
Despite its downfalls, natural gas is still the preferred fossil fuel of the future. Its abundance
makes it a desirable alternative to other non-renewable resources, and its relative cleanliness compared to
other fossil fuels – such as crude oil and coal – make it the preferred option in fossil fuel development.22
HORIZONTAL DRILLING AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
A discussion of social license is relevant today largely because of the technological advances of
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. A common misconception is that the two technologies are
synonymous with the drilling process; however, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are two
distinct, separate processes that might be applied to an oil and gas drilling and production operation.
Horizontal drilling allows an operator to drill laterally, potentially covering more surface area of a
shale resource than drilling vertically might accomplish.23 On the other hand, hydraulic fracturing
involves injecting water, sand and chemicals into a geologic formation to create fractures in the rock to
increase permeability, thereby increasing the flow of oil and/or gas out of low permeability rocks.24
Neither of these technologies is new. For example, hydraulic fracturing has been used in the United States
since at least 1948.25 However, it is the mastering of the processes and the ability to conduct them
economically that makes their use so widespread today.
CONVENTIONALS V. UNCONVENTIONALS
Unconventional natural gas development, which highly utilizes the processes of horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing, is distinguishable from conventional gas development. While both processes result
in the extraction of natural gas, conventional and unconventional recovery processes are distinct.
Conventional natural gas development, used for over 100 years, refers to the traditional process of
extracting oil and gas from reservoirs below the earth’s surface. In this process, gas is trapped in various
porous zones of rock, typically in smaller volumes, which are relatively easy to develop.26 For most
conventional wells, operators utilize vertical drilling methods, and hydraulic fracturing is not necessary to
recover the gas in place. Under conventional methods, the porosity of the rock is adequate enough to
allow for a sufficient flow of gas out of the well.27

19

Natural Gas, supra note 14.
Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas: Global Warming Emissions, supra note 16.
21
These impacts, however, can be attributed to shale gas development regardless of whether conventional or
unconventional drilling and production methods are used. See Nathan Richardson, supra note 1.
22
Why is Natural Gas a Better Fossil Fuel?, supra note 13.
23
Nathan Richardson, et al., supra note 1.
24
Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx.
25
Thomas E. Kurth, Understanding Hydraulic Fracturing Issues, Challenges and Regulatory Regime, PRACTICAL
LAW GROUP 1 (2012).
26
Conventional & Unconventional, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS,
http://www.capp.ca/canadaIndustry/naturalGas/Conventional-Unconventional/Pages/default.aspx.
27
Formation of Natural Gas and Current Reserves, EON, http://www.eon.com/en/business-areas/exploration-andproduction/what-is-e-and-p/formation-of-natural-gas-and-reserves.html.
20
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Unconventional gas development is a more recent phenomenon that has emerged based on
mastering horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology to extract natural gas from virtually
impermeable rock with less than ideal porosity. Unconventional shale resources are typically found in
tight sands, shale, or coal beds.28 To extract the natural gas from these tight structures, operators must
create artificial pathways in the rock to release the natural gas.29 The unconventional drilling process
allows for the recovery of natural gas resources from rock formations previously thought unrecoverable.
Most of the growth in supply of recoverable natural gas is attributable to unconventional gas reservoirs.30

31

WHY STUDY NOW? THE IMPORTANCE OF GAS IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD ENERGY GENERATION
The study of the shale gas boom and its associated social impacts is a highly relevant topic that warrants
attention from industry, regulators, scholars, and the public. According to the United States Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA) International Energy Outlook, natural gas will be the world’s fastest
growing fossil fuel, with consumption rates growing at 1.5 percent per year through 2040.32 This growth
will occur in every region of the world, and will be highly concentrated in developing countries where the
demand for natural gas is expected to occur twice as fast as in developed countries.33 It is expected to
occur over the next 20 years despite the dramatic recent weakening in global energy markets, and will be
driven by ongoing economic expansion in Asia, particularly in China and India.34 Population growth and
increases in income per person are key drivers behind the increasing demand for energy.35 According to
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (commenting on the recent BP Energy Outlook Report), “the
revolution in the production of shale gas and tight oil is expected to continue, with their share in primary
energy production rising about 10 percent in 2035.”36
28

Id.
Additionally, in the past few years, hydraulic fracturing has been applied to some conventional wells as secondary
recovery efforts to maximize production.
30
Conventional & Unconventional, supra note 26.
31
Formation of Natural Gas and Current Reserves, supra note 27.
32
Natural Gas, supra note 14.
33
Id.
34
BP’s Energy Outlook 2035 in Brief, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energyeconomics/energy-outlook/outlook-to-2035.html.
35
Id.
36
Martin Wolf, The riches and perils of the fossil-fuel age, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 4, 2015, at 7.
29
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THE SHALE GAS BOOM & THE GOLDEN AGE OF GAS
Recent innovations in the drilling and producing processes have drawn attention to what some term the
“Shale Boom,” the “Shale Revolution” or even the “Golden Age of Gas.” These terms generally refer to a
major shift in thinking regarding global natural gas reserves. Not more than a decade ago, there was a
large consensus that hydrocarbon production was in a decline. But based on the above-referenced
technologic advances, finding and producing gas in tight shale formations can now be accomplished
economically.37
The “Golden Age of Gas” ideology, as coined by the International Energy Agency (IEA),
considers the big picture of unconventional gas development. According to IEA Executive Director Maria
van der Hoeven, “exploiting the world’s vast resources of unconventional natural gas holds the key to a
golden age of gas…but for that to happen, governments, industry and other stakeholders must work
together to address legitimate public concerns about the associated environmental and social impacts.”38
The IEA has noted that if environmental regulation is developed in line with these principles in mind,
environmental performance will lead to a level of public acceptance that provides industry with a
necessary “social license to operate.”39 Companies must consider the social impacts of shale gas
extraction projects. Those companies who effectively evaluate these social impacts will be best positioned
to earn a social license to operate from the communities surrounding the project area.
II. Social license to operate
Social license to operate is a tool whereby companies manage socio-political risk by conforming to a set
of implicit rules imposed by their stakeholders.40 “While social license to operate is a fundamentally
intangible concept, the concept does not lack definition or prescription for achievement.”41 It is an
ongoing social contract with society that allows a project to both start and continue operating in a
community.42 Social license to operate derives from communities’ perception of a company and its
operations, comprised of a company’s ongoing acceptance and approval from stakeholders.43
Social license to operate can be conceptualized as both a goal and as a set of rules to be
followed.44 It is “not as simplistic as a company’s stamp of a community’s approval but rather it reflects
37

Edward L Morse, Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next Shale, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141202/edward-l-morse/welcome-to-the-revolution.
38
Interview with Maria van der Hoeven, IEA Executive Director, in James Stafford, The Golden Age of Gas,
Possibly: Interview With the IEA, OILPRICE.COM (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://oilprice.com/Interviews/TheGolden-Age-of-Gas-Possibly-Interview-with-the-IEA.html.
39
Id.
40
Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, Measuring the Extent of a Social License to Operate: The
Influence of Marine Biodiversity Offsets in the Oil and Gas Sector in Western Australia, 42 RESOURCES POLICY 121,
121 (2015).
41
John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective, 38 RESOURCES POLICY 29, 32
(2013).
42
Damien Giurco, et. al., Responsible Mineral and Energy Futures: Views at the Nexus, 84 JOURNAL OF CLEANER
PRODUCTION 327 (2014).
43
Robert G. Boutilier & Ian Thomson, Modelling and Measuring the Social Licence to Operate: Fruits of a
Dialogue Between Theory and Practice, INTERNATIONAL MINE MANAGEMENT (2011); Richard Parsons, Justine
Lacey, & Kieren Moffat, Maintaining Legitimacy of a Contested Practice: How the Minerals Industry Understands
its “Social License to Operate,” 41 RESOURCES POLICY 83, 84 (2014).
44
Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12; Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40,
at 121.
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an ongoing and negotiated process where a community objection of one element of a project does not
necessarily mean that the full support is being threatened or withdrawn.”45 Obtaining a social license to
operate is critical for companies, since the failure to obtain this license will likely result in ongoing
conflict and controversy with local communities.46
Social license to operate is, in many respects, a risk management tool. If a company can evaluate
its social license, the company can assess its current level of risk associated with a project and take
measures to reduce that risk.47 Obtaining a social license to operate ensures that a company has addressed
and reduced its socio-political risks.
STAKEHOLDERS DEFINED
When defining social license to operate, it important to also define and identify the “stakeholders” from
which the social license should be earned. Stakeholders can be defined broadly or narrowly. A broad
definition of stakeholders might include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objectives.”48 Under this designation, almost anybody can be
considered a stakeholder in a company’s project. However, under a more narrow definition, “stakeholders
bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something
of value, in a firm.”49 This narrower definition requires that a stakeholder has some level of risk
associated to a company’s project. Regardless of which definition is applied, stakeholders can be
individuals, groups, or organizations, and stakeholders may or may not be part of the geographic
community in which a project takes place.50
Defining “stakeholders” is critical part of the social license process and can create great heartburn
for companies. Oftentimes, there are many individuals, groups, or organizations that are potential
stakeholders, but their involvement in a project may be so minimal that it is debatable whether they
should be included as part of the social license evaluation process.51 Inclusion of these individuals,
groups, or organizations is ultimately an internal business decision. Regardless of the type of definition of
stakeholder that a company adopts, a company should clearly define and identify all potential
stakeholders at the outset of a project.
Moreover, companies oftentimes have difficulty securing a social license because the network of
stakeholders is internally divided.52 As noted above, stakeholders can also be groups, or coalitions of
groups.53 Therefore, companies must also be aware of the dynamics within each stakeholder group and as

45

Justine Lacey, Richard Parsons, & Kieren Moffat, Exploring the concept of a Social License to Operate in the
Australian Minerals Industry, CSIRO 7 (2012).
46
Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconventional Oil and Gas Development, 13
WYO. L. REV. 5, 51 (2013).
47
Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 121.
48
Ronald K Mitchell, Bradley R Agle, & Donna J Wood, Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 853, 853
(1997).
49
Id. at 853-54.
50
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, Social License to Operate, SME MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 3RD
EDITION, SOCIETY FOR MINING, METALLURGY, AND EXPLORATION INC. 1779, 1781 (2011).
51
Ronald K Mitchell, Bradley R Agle, & Donna J Wood, supra note 48, at 854-54.
52
R.G. Boutilier, L.D. Black, & I. Thomson, From Metaphor to Management Tool – How the Social License to
Operate can Stabilize the Socio-Political Environment for Business, INTERNATIONAL MINE MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE (2012).
53
Id.
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well as the relationships among existing stakeholders to define both who is aligned and who has
influential power.54
HISTORY OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE: EMERGENCE IN THE MINING INDUSTRY
The concept of social license to operate is largely rooted in the mining industry. After several
environmental incidents in the 1990’s, the mining industry suffered from a greatly diminished reputation
in local communities surrounding project areas.55 In 1997, at a meeting with World Bank personnel in
Washington, D.C., Jim Cooney, then Director of International and Public Affairs with Placer Dome,
proposed that the mining industry act to address diminishing reputations by obtaining a “social license to
operate.”56 Cooney’s comments were largely based on his concerns with instable governments in
developing countries not only halting major mining projects, but also failing to include local communities
affected by such projects in the decision-making processes. Thus, the social license concept emerged to
include local communities in decision-making processes while paralleling the legal licensing process.57
Following Cooney’s comments in 1997, the concept of social license to operate gained traction
and continued to develop as a part of the mining industry dialogue. In 2002 the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED) issued a report on the mining industry entitled “Breaking New
Ground: Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development.”58 The report noted that the concept of social
license to operate initially developed as a defense mechanism for companies to address local distrust of
industry, and that many companies had failed to convince constituents and stakeholders that they had a
social license to operate.59 The notion that companies should earn a social license to operate stuck, soon
becoming part of the common vernacular in many corporate sustainability programs and implemented as
an offensive tactic in preventing community mistrust. According to the International Council on Mining
and Metals, by 2012, “the concept of social license to operate has been widely accepted by the mining
industry.”60 However, the adoption and practice of social license was not met without hesitation, hurdles,
or heartbreak. “Perhaps the greatest challenge to the value of mineral resources in recent years has
been…social license to operate,” one former Rio Tinto executive has written.61
Since its emergence in the late 1990’s in the mining industry, social license to operate has gained
support among many stakeholder groups including “mining companies, civil society, non-governmental
organizations, research institutions, governments, and consultants.”62 It has also been applied to other
industries including paper manufacturing, alternative energy generation, and agriculture.63 Its widespread
acceptance and successful application in other industrial and resource extractive industries make it an
attractive option for application in the shale gas industry.
54

Id.
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1779.
56
Id.
57
Jen Gerson, Rise of ‘Social Licence’: Claiming They Speak for Their Community, Protest Groups are
Undermining the Law, THE NATIONAL POST (Oct. 17, 2014), available at
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/10/17/rise-of-social-licence-believing-they-speak-for-their-community-protestgroups-are-undermining-the-law/#__federated=1.
58
Minerals Mining and Sustainable Development Final Report, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (2002) available at http://www.iied.org/mmsd-final-report.
59
John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, supra note 41, at 29.
60
In Brief: Mining’s Contribution to Sustainable Development -- An Overview, ICMM 5 (June 2012).
61
Ken Haddow, Should Mineral Rights for Hard-Rock Minerals be Awarded by Tender?, 32 JOURNAL OF ENERGY
& NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 335, 345 (Aug. 2014).
62
Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, The Paths to Social Licence to Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining
Community Acceptance of Mining, 39 RESOURCES POLICY 61 (2014).
63
Id.
55
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ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE
As noted, the concept of social license to operate is not without definition. Certain criteria can be applied
to define and categorize a company’s social license. Ian Thomson and Robert Boutilier have identified
three major criteria that a company must establish to achieve the highest level of social license:
legitimacy, credibility and trust.64
The first criterion, legitimacy, requires that a company spread awareness, listen to community
concerns, and follow official and unofficial local norms, customs and practices.65 To establish legitimacy,
a company should establish its legal status, inform the community on how past projects have succeeded,
and seek community participation from all constituents, regardless of age or gender, in planning and
decision-making66
The second criterion is credibility. “When a company is regarded as credible, it is seen as
following through on promises and dealing honestly with everyone.”67 Establishing credibility requires
following through and taking action based on information or knowledge known by the company.68
Credibility can be achieved by transparency and consistency in decision-making.69
Trust is the final criterion of a social license to operate. Trust is the degree to which the entire
public holds collective trust towards an organization.70 Companies should strive to achieve “full trust”
from the public in their organization. “T]he term full trust means a broader and deeper trust. Credibility is
a basic level of truth related to honesty and reliability. A full trust relationship is one where there is a
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others.”71 When a community has trust in a company, the
community feels confident that the company will act in the best interest of the community.72 It requires
going beyond a company doing what it says it will do.73 It requires collaboration and develops over
time.74 As it has been said, “Trust is hard to earn, easy to lose, and very difficult to recover once lost.”75
Based on the components of legitimacy, credibility, and trust, a company can achieve four levels
of social license to operate: withdrawal, acceptance, approval, and psychological identification with a
project.76 The highest level of social license, psychological identification with a project, is associated with
the least amount of risk and is ideally what companies should aim for when developing social license
programs. However, most successful social license programs that reduce corporate risk fall within the
approval level of social license to operate.77

64

Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12, at 347.
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1784-85.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, supra note 62, at 61-70.
71
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12, at 347.
77
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786.
65
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Withdrawal is the lowest level of public acceptance. At the withdrawal level, no level of social
license is achieved, and minerals will go undeveloped.78 This is the worst-case scenario for companies
and can result in a community halting progress on a project.79 Community withdrawal is often marked by
shutdown, blockade, boycott, violence, sabotage, and legal challenges to a corporate project.80
Acceptance is achieved when legitimacy is recognized but a company has not yet established
credibility. In this stage, the community does not have a particular reason to doubt a company’s
credibility, but the community members are still reluctant about proceeding with approval of a project.81
The acceptance level of social license to operate is troubled by recurring issues and threats from the
community, interference by outside organizations such as non-governmental organizations, and third
party monitoring of a project.82
Approval is achieved when a company establishes both legitimacy and credibility. At the
approval level, a community views the company as a good neighbor. At this point, a company can
securely access the resources it needs, and the community has pride in the company’s projects.83 The
community has a positive outlook towards projects and is happy with its existence.84 At the approval
level, there is no longer sociopolitical risk associated with the project.85
Psychological identification is achieved when a community has full trust in a company and the
community fully supports a project.86 Rather than “us and them,” the relationship between community
and company represents a “we,” marked by co-ownership in the project.87 At this point, the community
will defend the company against outside criticisms or attempts to impede project movement, making this
level unique and stronger than others.88 “Very few companies have actually succeeded in taking their
community relations to this level.”89
BUT IS SOCIAL LICENSE EVEN NECESSARY?
The concept of social license has not developed without criticism. Some critics argue that achieving a
social license is unattainable based on the nature of modern society and the structure of governments.
These arguments are largely centered on the philosophy that perfect consensus within general society is
impossible, and regulatory bodies exist to define legal licenses because the general public is incapable of
agreement.90 Assuming regulatory authorities appropriately manage environmental social concerns in the
legal licensing process, acceptance of this social philosophy would negate all need for a social license to
operate.

78

Id. at 1784.
Id.at 1779, 1784, 1786.
80
Tay Wiles, What I Learned from Western Royalty, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/what-i-learned-from-western-royalty/print_view.
81
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1785.
82
Tay Wiles, supra note 80.
83
Id.
84
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786.
85
Id.
86
Id.; Tay Wiles, supra note 80.
87
Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Jen Gerson, supra note 57.
79

10 | S o c i a l L i c e n s e t o O p e r a t e : F r a c t u r i n g a n d O i l & G a s

Moreover, social license to operate has been criticized as undermining the law.91 A social license
may place a great deal of authority in the social, intangible, extra-legal license, thereby taking value away
from legal licenses. Some critics go as far as to say that legitimization of social license may actually result
in violent protest. When discussing social license to operate as it applies to Indigenous communities in
Canada, Dwight Newman writes:
any overly enthusiastic embrace of social license to operate in its mistakenly transformed
senses is actually a rejection of the rule of law and a suggestion that Canada should become
a less well-ordered society…over-enthusiastic embraces of social license that actually
misinterpret it through a sort of mistake about categories thereby undermine legally
determined rights and even legitimize physical violence. Those who have rushed to
embrace some interpretations of social license because they are socially minded and
support better flourishing of people in society should really think about whether they want
to embrace a form of the concept through which they may legitimize physical
violence…legitimization of a concept that breaks down the rule of law is not helpful to
industry, and it is not helpful to Indigenous communities.92
Social license to operate has also been criticized as placing too much authority in the general public.
Under social license, corporations now must negotiate directly with members of the community, a “freemarket killing concept” in line with communism in that everything belongs to the people, one observer
has asserted.93
Despite the criticism, however, there are many who believe social license to operate is a positive
development. Dwight Newman also writes that:
At a real level, social license to operate has practical effects. At the same time, there are
important reasons to resist any drift in the concept. So long as it remains a descriptive
concept for business to be able to analyze factors that include what are ultimately legitimate
impacts against business, it is a valuable tool for those bold enough to try to create
prosperity in a sometimes unwelcoming world.94
In addition, many experts recognize the business risks associated with not achieving a social license to
operate. Some emphasize that only recently have environmental concerns and their associated impact on
corporate risk for failure to obtain a social license come to light.95 Stakeholders now have the ability to
impose additional costs on companies or can potentially impact conditions on financing.96 Stakeholders
can achieve this by organizing boycotts, media campaigns, lobbying governments, or legally challenging
projects.97 Achieving a social license to operate is imperative because communities have the ability to
impact a company’s image or reduce its market share.98 Therefore, social license to operate is a critical
tool in evaluating the risk associated with community opposition to a project and identifying the
appropriate measures to minimize that risk.
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III. Social license to operate in the Oil and Gas Industry
HISTORY
In general
The consideration of a social license to operate in the oil and gas industry started in the final years of the
20th century. It began in the context of oil and gas development taking place primarily in the developing
world. Still, the issue would not attract a great deal of attention in the developed world until the decade
beginning in 2010.
In the late 1990s, social license to operate in the oil and gas industry initially took the form of
securing what was then referred to as a “license to operate” in addition to any legal or regulatory
requirements. “By ‘license to operate,’ the companies meant something beyond the production-sharing
contracts that producers signed with host country governments, or the [engineering, procurement, and
construction] contracts engineering firms signed to build plants in the country not their own,” Bob
Tippee, editor of the Oil & Gas Journal, has written.99 “’License to operate’ means not just legal
permission to perform specific work but social sanction for business activity,” he wrote adding,
“Judgments about it are rendered not in courts of law, but in the much less well-defined yet often more
potent court of culture.”100
However, by 2010, the discussion within the international development industry about the license
to operate had begun to fade for several reasons. “One easy answer,” Mr. Tippee suggested, was “that the
concept has been absorbed into a more general emphasis – albeit an important one – on corporate
responsibility.”101 Moreover, by 2010, many host country governments were keeping the best projects for
themselves, thus reducing to some extent the role of international oil and gas firms.102 Finally, the antiglobalization effort, which had blossomed in the late 1990s bringing with it a general antipathy for the
work of many global companies, had diminished.103 Notwithstanding these developments, Mr. Tippee
argued that in 2010 “the topic is more important than ever,” stating that transparency was a key element
in the overall discussion.104 “Priorities such as health, safety, and environmentally sound behavior are
vitally important and closely linked to the legitimacy of energy work – expatriate or otherwise,” he
observed.105
Despite what had taken place in the international oil and gas development context, the matter of
social license to operate in the developed world did not really begin until the advent of unconventional oil
and gas development using horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing was introduced and implemented
in a major way around 2010. The combination of these technologies allowed developers to extract
resources from shale plays near urban settings. As a consequence, the stage was set for the current debate
about the industry’s social license to operate in unconventional developments.
The social license to operate “gap” between the mining and oil and gas industries
99
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In many settings, the mining and oil and gas industries share the appellation of extractive industries.
“Both industries extract non-renewable mineral resources with consequent issues of resource depletion
and conservation,” Jim Cooney has said.106 However, there are major differences between how the
industries operate. “Mines often have long lifespans that stimulate the formation of new or expanded
communities, which are prone to economic depression during cyclical downturns in commodity
prices…[In addition] the population explosion around mines poses significant risks to surface and ground
water,” Mr. Cooney has observed.107
On the other hand, oil and gas development typically is undertaken in relatively quick steps,
leading the industry to often assume – or behave as if – it has less need of a long-term relationship with
the community where the work is being done. One Montana-based activist has explained it this way:
There’s a significant reason why oil and gas companies will never make a serious effort to
engage with this community the way the [local mine] has. The answer lies primarily in the
oil and gas cycle… Companies come in for a quick profit. At most they stay a few years,
and their complicated financial relationships with other companies mean that much of their
work is subcontracted to others. Their employees come and go, frequently without families,
often living in temporary housing. The mine, by contrast, is in the community for the long
term. They have a small number of locations, their employees live in the community and
send their children to local schools, and as a result the company and its employees have to
live with the consequences of the way they run their business. It makes sense to work with
the community as good neighbors.108
As a consequence of how mining is undertaken, as well as public concern and criticism of the impacts of
mining, the industry “has moved farther than other industries outside its comfort zone to diffuse criticism,
to find common ground with critics and to change itself,” Mr. Conney has said.109 “[T]he mining industry
[has] learned matters both of process and of substance: from the engagement process, mining companies
have learned difficult models of comprehensive dialogue and consensus building with critics. By listening
to their critics, the companies have learned different approaches to analyzing and managing critical
issues,” he adds.110
Looked at another way, the mining industry understands “that obtaining a formal license to
operate from governments and meeting regulatory requirements is no longer enough. Instances of mining
developments being delayed, interrupted, and even shut down due to public opposition have been
extensively documented.”111
THE NECESSITY OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
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The absence of social license to operate by an oil and gas firm can be a significant impediment, as it is
likely to raise important social-political risk in the form of development disruption.112 The impacts of
such disruption are many, but perhaps the most important is putting profits at risk.113
There are two concepts that underpin the increasing need for oil and gas companies to acquire and
maintain a social license to operate. The first involves “observable shifts in governance from State to nonstate actors [that] have given more power to civil society to inform decision-making.”114 The second is
founded in “people’s concerns [that] have been influenced by the spreading of the sustainability
paradigm, which emphasizes in particular the importance of preserving…natural capital.”115
Looked at from an oil and gas company’s perspective, the need for the industry to support
tougher regulatory requirements – in this specific instance methane regulations – is “all about social
license to operate.”116
There is also the matter that in many cases companies will go back to wells that have been
previously fractured. If the social license was not established the first time, or if established but not
maintained, then a company (or its successor) may find it is not welcome “the second time around.” This
will become increasingly important as operators take advantage of advances in technology to refracture
existing wells. “Refracturing and recompleting existing horizontal oil and gas wells is becoming more
prevalent as companies work to make the most of their assets amid pricing uncertainty,” according to FTI
Consulting, Inc., which works in the oil and gas sector.117
On the other hand, there are potential weaknesses associated with an industry raising the profile
of social license in the form of the “failure…to articulate a collaborative developmental agenda for the
sector.”118 In this regard, “A necessary step in this process is for industry to reconcile its internal riskorientation with external expectations and this requires a less defensive and more constructive approach to
engagement and collaboration.”119
WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR
Despite the efforts of many companies, there remains a deep-seated apprehension among some investor
groups that the industry’s efforts have not allayed the public’s concerns associated with unconventional
development, thus putting the social license to operate at risk. For example, one investor group focusing
on North America has said, “As evidenced by the continuing controversy over allowing shale energy
development to move forward in Colorado, California, New York, Eastern Canada, and elsewhere, energy
companies have still not managed to allay public concerns about the risks associated with their operations
and continue to face potential loss of their social license to operate.”120
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Still, this same group stated that there were significant opportunities to address this risk stating,
“We believe companies implementing current best practices in operations and providing thoroughly
transparent information about these efforts will: enhance the likelihood of securing and maintaining their
social license to operate; reduce regulatory and reputational risks; reduce liabilities associated with poor
performance, spills, contamination, and lawsuits; and thereby increase their access to capital.”121
Historic barriers to engagement
Numerous concepts could be pointed to as having been (and continuing to be) historic barriers to
engagement. Identifying and analyzing them can be helpful in considering how they might be more
successfully addressed in the future.
Perhaps the key element that underscores the current barrier of engagement is simply this: the
historical lack of trust between the industry and its stakeholders. But what exactly is trust? Professor
Geoffrey Hosking122 from University College London has considered the history of trust. In his words,
“One of the many difficulties involved in studying trust is that it is several phenomena at once. It is first
of all a feeling…Trust is also an attitude…Trust is also a relationship, between oneself and another
person, collective of persons or institution…All three aspects of the world ‘trust’ then…imply a social
context, and they are all to do with behavior and action or the potential for action.”123
The corrosive influence of a situation in which lack of trust takes root can be extremely
damaging. As Professor Hosking has written, “Once unleashed, distrust can spread like a forest fire in
dry, windy weather…Trust and distrust are part of the deep grammar of any society, the way in which we
relate to each other, trust or distrust each other, determines much of our social behavior. In order to take
decisions and act in real life, we need to trust in other people, in institutions, or simply in the future. As an
Indian policymaker has commented, ‘Confidence grows at the rate a coconut tree grows, and it falls at the
rate a coconut falls.’”124
Trust also needs to be understood in the context of identity. “We tend to trust those who most
resemble us because they are using symbolic systems similar to our own,” according to Professor
Hosking.125 “Hence we feel a sense of community with them, and to trust them requires little conscious
efforts.”
The perceived lack of openness by the oil and gas industry towards its stakeholders underpins this
lack of trust. This is a crucial barrier since, “The openness of all involved is vital,” as a report about
hydraulic fracturing by the U.K. House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, recently
observed.126 This lack of openness, whether real or perceived, has lead one investor group to assert that
the industry “has still not managed to allay public concerns about the risks associated with their
operations and continue to face potential loss of their social license to operate.”127 On the other hand, the
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lack of trust can be viewed from the industry’s perspective as well. No set of professionals will react
favorably when it perceives, real or imagined, that it is being attacked for being irresponsible.
The lack of openness, again real or perceived, finds its way into the matter of whether the public
thinks adequate information has been made available by the industry. In the absence of this so-called
“adequate” information, “[T]he public lacks a sufficient basis for evaluating fracking and horizontal
drilling operations, and is left with only its intuition and the information put forth by third parties.”128
Relying on third parties who may have their own parochial perspective is not likely to result in a clearer
picture of the risks and benefits associated with development.
Associated with the involvement of third parties mentioned above is the problem of polarization.
The recent report by the U.K. House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee described the
problem in these words: “Public acceptance…is critical in determining whether fracking should continue
in the U.K…[B]ut we are unable to see at this stage how the crucial ‘social licence’ can be established
when the debate around fracking is so polarized.”129 Once polarization is in place, then there is a very real
chance that the issue quickly becomes politicized and all parties to the underlying issues may lose control
of the real issues at hand.
Finally, there is the challenge associated with “post normal” science, a term credited to Professors
David Ravitz and Silvio Funtowitz.130 Hydrofracturing is an example of a post normal technology, which
is typified by “excess amount of controversy, dueling fact sheets, or information campaigns, dramatized
polarities (‘for’ and ‘against’), and deeply entrenched misunderstandings on both sides.”131 In this
situation, “[E]xperts on both sides [are] embroiled in nasty disagreements about data. In these cases,
having more information does not always settle public unease about extractive projects.”132
In numerous respects, the theme of trust – or lack thereof – is associated with many of the barriers
to engagement. The need to fully address the matter of trust cannot be underestimated since, “When social
trust breaks down, it tends to reconfigure in a lower-level collective, which then erects rigid boundaries
around itself.”133
The “social amplification of risk”
The relationship between the deployment of a potentially hazardous technology and the social setting in
which it will take place can result in establishing an unsubstantiated negative image within the public’s
collective mind.
Ian Thomson, who has a long history of working with the natural resources industry, has
described it this way: “As information about the possible hazard is exchanged, either through word of
mouth between individuals or through the mass media, internet and social media such as Facebook and
Twitter, a population may come to perceive the risk of impact as a threat that is many times greater than
that calculated by informed experts.”134 He refers to this as the “social amplification of risk.”
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Mr. Thomson has identified several factors that contribute to the social amplification of risk:
“[S]election, sensational and/or inaccurate media reporting of risks and regulatory actions to control them;
the use of technical language; limits in the ability of non-specialists to understand technical information;
intolerance for scientific uncertainty on the way in which risk is described as an abstract percentage or
frequency relative to some (seemingly irrelevant) standard; and failure to address the concerns of the
public directly.”135 The end result, in many instances is that “social amplification is…the precursor to
stigmatization of a hazard, project or indeed, the industrial activity (fracking) itself.”136
Non-trade association efforts to promote social license
There have been a small number of non-trade association affiliated efforts to promote social license in the
oil and gas context. Most of these efforts have involved the Marcellus Formation in the Appalachian
Basin in the eastern part of the U.S. This may be attributed to the fact that unconventional development
began at an early stage in Pennsylvania, a state that is politically “more balanced” than states such as
Texas or Oklahoma where the industry has a faced a more sympathetic reception.
Center for Sustainable Shale Development
The Center for Sustainable Shale Development137 (CSSD) describes itself as “a group of leading
environmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, and energy companies [that] has collaborated to
form a unique center to provide producers with certifications of performance standards for shale
development.”138 CSSD’s overall aim is “to encourage prudent and responsible development of shale gas
resources in the Appalachian region.”139
Established in 2013, CSSD is funded by foundations and energy companies operating in the
Marcellus Shale region. Founding participants included Chevron, the Clean Air Task Force, CONSOL
Energy, Environmental Defense Fund, Heinz Endowments, Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future, Shell and
the Penn Foundation.140
CSSD received considerable press coverage when it was launched, including a laudatory editorial
in The Washington Post.141 The Pittsburgh Quarterly, in characterizing several editorials about the CSSD,
said the coalition was a “long-overdue step toward bridging ideological differences and in addressing the
environmental safety concerns at the heart of shale gas controversy.”142
CSSD was announced at the same time a predecessor organization launched 15 initial
performance standards “designed to ensure safe and environmentally responsible development of the
135
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Appalachian Basin’s abundant shale gas resources.”143 These standards, which underpin CSSD’s thirdparty certification process, are the main focus of CSSD. However, the CSSD also has been involved in
supporting fracking-related legislation in Ohio, a move that resulted in criticism of the organization.144
The level of financial support from the oil and gas industry has caused some to suggest “the
funding balance [has] shifted too heavily to industry members.”145
The Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research
The Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research146 (MCOR), launched in 2013,147 is Penn State
University’s research and education initiative related to unconventional gas development. It serves a host
of stakeholders including industry, environmental groups, landowners, state agencies, and elected
officials.
MCOR is “committed to expanding research capabilities on technical aspects of developing this
resource and to providing science-based programming while protecting the Commonwealth’s water
resources, forests and transportation infrastructure.”148
MCOR’s activities include:149
 Researching extraction methods, including alternative fracturing methods and water treatment
and disposal;
 Evaluating workforce issues including training and community changes;
 Publishing reports and presenting programs about changes in land use and landowner decisionmaking; and
 Providing information about legal issues including regulation as well as pipeline siting and tax
revenues.
MCOR offers a series of short courses for environmental consultants, project planners and engineers,
economic development officials, water and wastewater treatment managers, and government officials.150
The university’s College of Agricultural Sciences, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, Penn
State Institutes of Energy and the Environment and Penn State Outreach collectively fund the MCOR.151
However, on at least one occasion it is reported to have used industry funding to offer a “Shale Gas
Regulators Training Program.”152
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Appalachian Shale Recommended Practices Group
The Appalachian Shale Recommended Practices Group153 (ASRPG,) is a consortium of 11 oil and gas
producers operating in the Appalachian Basin. These operators “have come together to identify and
disseminate responsible standards and practices for effective environmental, health and safety practices
utilized in shale natural gas and oil development operations in the Appalachian region.”154 Participating
companies include Anadarko, Chesapeake Energy, Chevron, Shell, WPX Energy and XTO Energy.
The ASRPG uses a “consensus-based approach to developing the recommended standards and
practices for Appalachian Shales provides a roadmap to enhance transparency and regulatory complicate,
as well as empowers workers to stop work that is potentially unsafe, emphasizes the important of
optimizing local content…”155
The ASRPG Recommended Standards and Practices,156 which were published in April 2012,
were developed entirely by the 11 companies.
Center for a Sustainable We2st
The ConocoPhillips Center for a Sustainable We2st157 (CSW) was launched in 2014 at the Colorado
School of Mines. CSW’s mission is “to promote the joint sustainability of unconventional energy
production and water resources through education of energy-water literate graduate and undergraduate
students, and by conducting world-class research on both community acceptance of unconventional
resource development, and water resources related to unconventional energy production.”158
Research undertaken by the CSW focuses on community acceptance and water resources
research.159 An innovative aspect of the CSW is its undergraduate scholars and graduate fellows
programs.160
Center director Terri Hogue, associate professor of civil and environmental engineering at Mines,
said, “Areas of focus for the center include education; community acceptance, communication and
corporate social responsibility research; and integrated water resources assessment research. The research
and educational initiatives undertaken at the center will benefit not only unconventional energy producers
and water-reliant industrial stakeholders, but also the general public.”161 ConocoPhillips provided $3
million in funding to start the center.162
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The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute
The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute163 (EI) “fosters interdisciplinary interactions among
colleges and schools across campus, while serving as a portal for external audiences interested in learning
more about energy research” conducted at the university.164 Although involved in policy issues at a high
level, the EI does not convene meetings where various stakeholders can move towards consensus
positions on controversial issues.
Other areas in which the EI is involved include education, convening energy-related conferences,
serving as a point of contact for industry, supplying grant money for faculty research, and publishing the
monthly UT Energy Bulletin,165 and promoting commercialization of energy concepts with industry.166
Energy funding at the University of Texas at Austin from all sources is about $70 million per year.167
Equitable Origin
Equitable Origin168 is a for-profit169 “social enterprise” with the mission of promoting “best practices and
continual improvement of responsible upstream oil and gas operations through a set of stakeholdernegotiated and internationally recognized environmental, social, and good governance standards.”170
Equitable Origin was co-founded by David Poritz171 and Manuel Pallares, who first met in
Ecuador, where both were working with communities in the Amazon.172 In early 2009, Equitable Origin,
which has focused primarily on the Amazon, organized a multi-stakeholder effort that included
governments, oil and gas companies, indigenous communities, social and environmental NGOs, and
academics “to create a rating system for social and environmental responsibility in oil and gas exploration
and production.”173 Out of this effort came the EO™100 Standard, which “consolidates and ensures
alignments with existing global standards and regulations.”174

http://www.conocophillips.com/newsroom/Pages/2014/ConocoPhillips-Establishes-the-ConocoPhillips-Center-fora-Sustainable-WE2ST-at-Colorado-School-of-Mines.aspx.
163
See Energy Institute, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, http://energy.utexas.edu/mission/.
164
Id.
165
See Energy Institute: UT Energy Bulletin, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, http://energy.utexas.edu/ut-energybulletin/.
166
Id.
167
See Energy Institute: Energy Funding Chart, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,
http://energy.utexas.edu/funding-chart/.
168
See EQUITABLE ORIGIN, http://www.equitableorigin.com/home/.
169
Equitable Origin is organized as a for profit venture because its founders concluded that “a for-profit model
would allow for additional flexibility and ability to scale faster in an industry that is several orders of magnitude
larger than industries other standard-setting organizations are working in.” See FAQs, EQUITABLE ORIGIN,
http://www.equitableorigin.com/faq/.
170
EO100™ Standard, EQUITABLE ORIGIN (February 2012 (A)), http://www.equitableorigin.com/media/eowebmedia/files_db/EO100_Standard_Shale_Oil_and_Gas_DRAFT_v2.pdf.
171
For a transcript of a recent video interview with Mr. Poritz, see Oil and Gas:
Certification System Rates Social and Environmental Responsibility of Production Sites, EETV, Nov. 24, 2014,
http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1902/transcript.
172
See Helping transform the oil and gas industry one site at a time, EQUITABLE ORIGIN,
http://www.equitableorigin.com/about-us/overview/.
173
See Our Story, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, http://www.equitableorigin.com/about-us/our-story/.
174
Id

20 | S o c i a l L i c e n s e t o O p e r a t e : F r a c t u r i n g a n d O i l & G a s

Until recently Equitable Origin had focused on onshore conventional oil and gas development.175
In early 2015, Equitable Origin released a draft of proposed standards, EO100™ Standard Technical
Addendum EO100.1: Shale Oil and Gas Operations,176 related to hydraulic fracturing in the U.S.177 The
proposed standards178 cover:
 Human rights, social impact and community development
 Fair labor and working condition
 Indigenous peoples’ right
 Climate change, biodiversity and environment
 Project lifecycle management
In announcing the proposed standards, Josh Garrett, a spokesman for Equitable Origin, said, “What we’re
looking to do is engaged all types of community members and groups that have been affected by shale oil
and gas development…We want to provide a space for people to get together and discuss the positive and
negative impacts, view our draft standards, give their input on it and help us develop standards in the
future that are feasible for the industry and help reduce risk, but also in a comprehensive way address all
of the concerns that a community may have with new sale oil and gas development coming into their
area.”179 The company hopes to apply its standards beginning in late 2015.180
Oil and Gas Accountability Project
A group that does not seem focused on social license to operate but should be mentioned is the Oil and
Gas Accountability Project (OGAP), 181 which is part of Washington, D.C.-based Earthworks.182 It
describes itself as “the only U.S. environmental nonprofit that focuses exclusively on the destructive
impacts of resource extraction on community and the environment, in the United States and around the
world.”183 Earthworks is the group behind the “No Dirty Gold” campaign,184 which includes some 80
retailers of jewelry who “have committed to cleaning up dirty metals” by sourcing metals more
responsibly.185
Trade association efforts to promote social license
Several trade associations have actively been involved in addressing social license-related issues. For
example, in 2014 the American Petroleum Industry (API) published its “Community Engagement
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Guidelines.”186 Moreover, the IPIECA, a global organization that focuses on environmental and social
issues of the oil and gas industry, established in 2002 a Social Responsibility Working Group, which
assesses good practices in the context of social responsibility, social impact, and community outreach.187
IPIECA has also published reports about “Oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability
reporting – 2010 update”188 and “A Guide to Social Impact Assessment in the Oil and Gas Industry.”189
These efforts are discussed below.
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
In general
Many ideas have been suggested as concepts involved with obtaining and maintaining a social license to
operate. This section identifies and analyzes the most effective concepts, which are referred to as
“guidelines.” The aim of the guidelines is to help oil and gas companies evaluate the risks and benefits of
implementing a particular guideline or suite of guidelines.
Before beginning, however, it is useful to note that social license is generally “granted on a sitespecific basis,”190 and thus not every concept will be appropriate in every circumstance. But this list,
gleaned from the best thinkers in the social license field, represents a well-considered starting point.
Building trust
Building trust among the developers and all stakeholders is fundamental to establishing the social license
to operate. The lack of trust is corrosive, often leading to intractable disagreements that offer no
reasonable ways forward.
But when a crisis of trust does develop, or appears to be developing, “[T]he optimal response
is…to attempt to broaden the radius of trust by seeking higher-level positive-sum games, reaching across
boundaries to solve common problem and discover common interest, hoping in the process to create the
first links of mutual trust, which can then be strengthened.”191 That said, there will always be issues that
must be treated confidentiality and cannot be disclosed, although deciding what information falls into this
category can represent “a tricky balance.”192
Finally, a key to building trust is for all parties to recognize that in cultivating “the skills
necessary to maintain it, we need to recognize the overriding importance of trust in the trustworthy.”193
Emphasizing and implementing early, ongoing communication and engagement
Improve community engagement
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The need for oil and gas companies to improve community engagement is fundamental to establishing
and maintaining a social license to operate. However, this comes with a cautionary warning: “This does
not mean developing more sophisticated public relations campaigns; more spin will not solve the
problem,”194 according to Professor Jen Schneider,195 an expert on public communication involving
environmental controversies.”
Bearing this in mind, improving engagement is particularly important in geographical areas not
familiar with oil and gas development. In launching its Community Engagement Guidelines196 in 2014,
the American Petroleum Institute (API) noted, “[T]he energy revolution is now occurring in areas of the
country where oil and natural gas exploration doesn’t have the same history as Texas or Oklahoma.”197
The Community Engagement Guidelines are a “first of its kind standard for community
engagement,” according to API.198 The Guidelines require, “Oil and gas operators acknowledge the
challenges associated with industry activities, which can include challenges important to a community.
Principles of integrity, transparency and consideration for community concerns underpin responsible
operations. Conscientious operators are committed to helping communities achieve positive and longlasting benefits. Both local stakeholder and operators can use this guidance...These suggested guidelines
are typical and reasonable and generally apply under normal operating circumstances.”199 While
impressive in many respects, the guidelines are just that – the ultimate decision about whether to
implement them is left up to the individual operator.200
The Guidelines are still relatively new, but they have already received some criticism. A U.S.
community group has said that the Guidelines will be ineffective. “The API is a public relations arm for
the oil and gas industry. They have written a document that has many positive elements, but has little
chance of being adopted by oil and gas operators, who are much more interested in a hit and run kind of
approach.”201 Interestingly enough despite this criticism, however, the group went on to compliment the
API’s efforts:
Throughout the entry phase, which is the one we are in today, the document encourages
frequent one on one meetings and community forums with local residents to talk about
things like road safety and traffic, providing communication materials that lay out the
company plans. They also suggest a way for local citizens to communicate concerns and
for the company to provide feedback on those concerns in a public way. There are
suggestions for working with local authorities on workforce development, defining likely
jobs and ways for residents to prepare for those jobs. The list goes on. The document
includes many good suggestions that could make a huge difference in how a community
sees the likely impact of oil and gas drilling.202
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One activist group does not speak for all groups, obviously, but it does suggest that the API may well
have opened up a “new front” in the industry’s efforts to engage more effectively and should be
recognized for such efforts.
In the eyes of Jim Cooney, who was addressing mining in this comment, “The accountability of
mines to society requires an on-going process of engagement with local and international stakeholders,
often through mine oversight or advisory committees, in a form of ‘shared governance.’”203 Whether and
how “shared governance” should play a role in the oil and gas sector remains to be seen. But Mr.
Cooney’s remarks come from experience and nearly two decades of observations and therefore deserve
careful consideration.
Engagement may even include some type of consultation with the community that is being
impacted. A major study undertaken by the IIED concluded that “increasingly ‘engagement’ is
understood to include ‘consultation,’ meaning that the community should be consulted – and on some
occasions even give its formal or informal consent – about the best way that the company can prevent and
mitigate its impact before, during, and after the project.”204 The same report defines “meaningful
consultation” as, “two-way communication in the form of a dialogue and with due regard for linguistic,
cultural, gender or other barriers, and sensitivity to cultural differences or perceived power imbalances
between the company and the community.”205
Looked at from the perspective of Christine Bader, an American who has worked for an
international oil and gas company, the key is to avoid an aggressive approach in the community where a
company is operating. “Extractive companies operating overseas have realized that the best approach is
not an antagonistic one, that you simply can’t throw up a wall, first of all, and try to block out the
community around you and take a defensive stance, never mind an offensive one,” Ms. Bader,206 a former
BP executive, has observed.207
A final observation on the importance of community engagement, and the benefits that may flow
to a company from undertaking this in a serious and comprehensive manner, is based on a recent study
conducted about a mining project in Australia. Researchers found that, “When community members
reported feeling heard, listened to, and that the company would act on their concerns, their trust in the
company was enhanced. Consequently, the acceptance of the mining operation increased…In the
literature, it has been suggested that when decision making processes are perceived as being fair, people
are more accepting of decisions even when the eventual decisions are not in their favour.”208
Establish stakeholder relations manager/department
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The crucial nature of engagement requires every oil and gas company employee (and subcontractor and
service provider employee) to consider him or herself invested in the “stakeholder management effort.”
However, a developer can leverage its engagement efforts even farther by establishing a position of
“manager of stakeholder relations” (or similar name) responsible for a department committed to the
effort.
The manager of stakeholder relations identifies and talks to all key stakeholders well before
drilling begins, pinpoints key areas where drilling might be appropriate (or not) based on his or her
engagement with the stakeholders, works with the operations engineers on well siting while bearing in
mind stakeholder concerns, is available through the drilling and fracturing processes to field calls and to
meet with stakeholders, and more. Anadarko Petroleum’s Colorado-based efforts have just a position and
accompanying department.209 Alex Hohmann,210 a professional engineer, is the first person in this newly
created position. Considered an expert on social license to operate, Mr. Hohmann defines it as “the level
of acceptance or approval continually granted to an organization’s operation or project(s) by the local
community and other stakeholders.”211
According to Mr. Hohmann, engagement is “tantamount to ‘Relationship 101.’”212 As he has
adeptly noted, “Stakeholder grievances seldom point to ‘hydraulic fracturing’ specifically,” but rather
subjects such as light, noise, traffic, notification, dust, proximity, duration (intensity) and visual
impediments.213
Ideally, the manager of stakeholder relations will be a petroleum engineer with experience in all
facets of unconventional development. Preferably, the manager of stakeholder relations should report to
the highest level of operations rather than the communications, public relations, or governmental relations
department. In this way the manager of stakeholder relations will have access to individuals within
operations who can stop or order a project change as a result of findings derived from stakeholder
engagement.
In Mr. Hohmann’s view, the risk associated with unconventionals going undeveloped is often
attributable “not for a lack of legal license, but for lack of growing, earning, and maintaining a social
license.”214
Effectively using social media
Social media has changed the landscape regarding how information is accessed as well as who provides it
and when. As a result, effectively using social media can represent a “critical success factor for resource
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development”215 according to energy communications experts at Makovsky Integrated Communications.
“Companies need to understand that communications is no longer a one-way street – talk with them, not
to them. With the emergence of social media and digital news, community members, activists, and
potential customers can all interact with any industry – in real time,” according to Andy Beck,
Makovsky’s executive vice president.216
Clearly, social media comes with risks. For example, companies need to understand that
technology – i.e., the Internet and social media – enhance “the ability of grass roots opposition to
mobilize and form coalitions of like-minded others…”217
But there are significant opportunities as well. “The speed and ubiquity of digital
communications both makes [a company’s] reputation more fragile…[but it also] allows corporations and
their leaders to develop their own channels…without the intermediation of pesky reports,” a columnist for
the Financial Times has written.218
Specific social media-steps include219:
 Sharing “compelling content”;
 Implementing “social listening programs”;
 Proactively monitoring potential crisis situations; and
 Increasing social followers.
The effective use of social media can benefit CEOs, who must “visibly engage and communicate both
inside and outside the organization,” an effort that is considered “extremely important” by Sir Mark
Moody-Stuart, former chairman of Royal Dutch Shell.220
Improve transparency
In general
Increasing transparency about operations associated with unconventional shale gas development is one of
the keys to developing or maintaining a social license to operate. The Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility and the Investor Environmental Health Network have suggested, “Companies must be
publicly transparent about managing their environmental footprint and social impacts, and engage with
key community stakeholders to earn and maintain their social license to operate.”221 Transparency, in the
eyes of these two organizations, “requires full disclosure of steps being taken to minimize risks, and
215
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acknowledgement of challenges and failures, and clearly defined steps to continually improve
operations.”222
A key element of improving transparency needs to include increased quantitative reporting. One
investor group has said, “[N]arrative reporting – anecdotal reporting of activities in one or two plays –
and aggregated company-wide reporting of impacts on a national or company-wide level, do not
sufficiently inform investors about how effectively companies are managing the risks or opportunity
associated with their operation. Companies should report data associated with their operational impacts
using quantitative metrics…in order for investors to be able to rigorously assess company practices.” 223
The need to divulge environmental performance and community impact reports also “creates a
powerful incentive to improve such performance, especially from a regulatory standpoint.”224
Another aspect of the need for more transparency is the requirement in some jurisdictions that
additional reporting take place. For example, in 2014 the European Union adopted legislation that will
require the disclosure in annual reports of large companies’ environmental performance and community
impacts.225 And in 2012, the Chinese Party Congress “ordered that all major industrial projects complete
a social risk assessment with slated impact mitigation measures before any project can being. This move
was aimed at addressing the increasingly violent environmental protests of the law several years...Zhou
Shengxian, the Environmental Minister announced that no major projects could be launched without
social risk evaluations. By doing so, he hoped to reduce the number of mass incidents in the future.”226
Toxic chemicals
Oil and gas operators can demonstrate a greater willingness to be transparent by disclosing the chemicals
they are using as well as reporting on efforts to reduce fracking fluid toxicity.”227
A recent investor report indicated that “[M]any companies communicate some kind of intent to
reduce the toxicity of their fracturing fluids…but very few provide data that would allow investors or
other stakeholders to evaluate the effectiveness of these initiatives in reducing the toxic chemical
use…including baseline toxicity, type of toxicity reductions, and percentage of total amount of chemical
reductions.”228
Notices of violations and fines
No company – oil and gas or otherwise – desires that its mistakes be called to the public’s attention.
However, taking a lead from the Global Reporting Initiative’s Oil and Gas Section Supplement,229 the
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“monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with
environmental laws and regulations” should be reported to all stakeholders.230
As stated by the GRI, “From an economic perspective, ensuring compliance helps to reduce
financial risks that occur either directly through fines or indirectly through impacts on reputations...The
strength of the organization’s compliance record can also affect its ability to expand operations or gain
permits.”231
Management team accountability
In many instances, the types of work that are associated with unconventional development may ultimately
represent financial risks to shareholders and companies “in the form of fines, regulations, resource
constraints, or the threat to their social license to operate.”232 Consequently, a corporate-level risk
management strategy that includes risks associated with environmental performance, health, safety and
social issues should be established.233
Increasing disclosure about the company’s environmental, health, safety and social risk
performance has to be a top level concern. In this regard, “Following the maxim of ‘what gets measured,
gets managed,’…oil and gas companies [should] increase disclosure about their use of current best
practices to minimize the environmental and community risks of their fracking activities.”234
Investors are also going to be interested in a company’s performance on these measures since it
will allow for a better understanding of how these business risks are being addressed.235 New York State
Comptroller Thomas P. DiPapoli said in 2014, “The long-term value of our investments in energy
companies depends on their transparency regarding the steps they’ve taken to manage environmental and
other risks inherent in the industry.”236 On the other hand, companies that have adopted best management
practices will be able to differentiate themselves from the laggards.237
A company’s performance in health, environmental, and safety should be reflected in the
compensation of executives and managers.238
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Moreover, increased emphasis should be placed on a company’s hiring of subcontractors “who
adhere to the highest standards.”239 Using independent third parties to verify health, safety, and
environmental performance for potential subcontractors and supplies may be useful in helping establish
the integrity of the process.240 It may also be useful to include a “social license to operate” provision,
which sets out responsibilities and expectations, in any agreements with subcontractors.
Identifying key stakeholders
Identifying key stakeholders is fundamental to establishing a social license to operate. Despite the
importance of this undertaking, however, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, each situation will
be slightly different. That said, there are some general principles that may be useful in identifying
stakeholders.
The classic definition of a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”241 This has been described as “one of the broadest
definitions in the literature, for it leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders
unambiguously open to include virtually anyone.”242
Within the context of stakeholders can be a number of types including, “dormant stakeholders,
dominant stakeholders, dangerous stakeholders, definitive stakeholders, discretionary stakeholders,
demanding stakeholders, dependent stakeholders...with varying levels of power, legitimacy and
urgency.”243
A complementary approach to identifying and working with stakeholders can be through a
process called “human geographic mapping,” which depicts “specific bio-social ecosystems and
[portrays] the attachment people develop to each other and to the land where they live and work. Social,
cultural and economic routines along with the geographic features of an area distinguish one population
or cultural area from another.”244 James A. Kent and Kevin Preister, experts about land use disputes, use
the mapping procedure along with “social ecology,” which they describe as “a science of community
based on cultural processes operating in any geographic area.”245 There are two keys to making the social
ecology effort successful. First, it must be initiated at the very beginning of the project and second “it
must have parity with the other disciplines in tactical and strategic decision-making.”246 Messrs. Kent and
Preister acknowledge that this approach takes more time at a project’s beginning, but that the cost and
time of responding to “community-driven disruptive issues” is reduced in the long run.247
Develop more sophisticated grievance mechanisms
Leading extractive industry companies are beginning to address community-based grievance procedures
through formal mechanisms that the companies establish.248 Establishing such mechanisms – or channels
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– is especially important in developing countries where tribunals and courts “can be inefficient, corrupt,
or reluctant to interfere with extractive industry activities. This can result in increased conflict and
resentment among host communities, which may be a key legacy challenge when one company acquires a
project from another.”249
A company-community grievance mechanism is a process “for receiving, evaluating and
addressing grievances from affected communities, in a timely and consistent manner at the site or
operational level. The mechanism may be wholly or partially run by the company.”250 However, this
mechanism is not a substitute for a firm’s “community engagement process or vice-versa. The two are
complementary and should be mutually reinforcing.”251
Top executives may resist establishment of a grievance mechanism. However there are several
business reasons for implementation, including “(1) meeting external standards and expectations, (2)
avoiding escalation of disputes and (costly) conflicts, and (3) learning for better decisions and
outcomes.”252
“Broaden” decision-making procedures
Whether the industry likes it or not, the public is demanding to have some sort of involvement in
decision-making.253 At a minimum, the views of stakeholders must have a well-defined way to reach
corporate decision-makers.254 In addition, cultural aspects of the community must, where appropriate, be
taken into consideration in terms of decision-making.255
Appropriately broadening decision-making in the very early stage of a project may help
overcome a “clash of cultures” between the developer and the local community. The historic approach to
decision-making has been characterized by designing in isolation from the community, proposing the
design, and finally defending a decision against opposition.256 In contrast, by involving the community
early, the community is given “a voice and emotional ownership, which in turns give the company a
social license to operate. If intentional efforts are made to resolve legitimate citizen issues early in the
design stage and optimize the local benefits of a project, citizen ownership through absorption will serve
as a buffer for the project against outside forces.”257
Another stakeholder group that must be taken into account is investors, and in particular the
“socially responsible investment movement.”258 In this regard, shareholder resolutions related to
environmental and social issues have been “on an ever-upward climb,” according to the Sustainable
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Investments Institute (SII).259 This trend has been the result of the shifting of investor advocacy “from a
moral approach to one that showed the business value of company action,” according to SII.260
Establish community development agreements
Community development agreements are increasingly being used in the natural resources industry “as a
form of and often legally sanctioned means for registering and securing stakeholder support for particular
projects.”261 However, it should be borne in mind that, “While agreements provide a tangible basis for
community engagement and benefit sharing with local communities, fulfillment of agreement conditions
does not always guarantee what the industry regards as a ‘social licence.’”262
Establish environmental agreements
Increasingly, environmental agreements (EA) are being used in the mining industry, with at least 120
being used in Canada alone.263 These agreements are “particular to specific…projects and exist alongside
the multiple voluntary international standards that seek to codify best business practices and asses firms’
[corporate social responsibility] performance.”264 An EA is “supra regulatory…in the sense that it exists
alongside formal processes like environmental impact assessment but is not itself prescribed in
regulation.”265
Expand environmental health research to integrate community perspectives
Community-based participatory research (CBPR) should be considered where there are community
perceptions of health stressors or impacts related to unconventional development.266 “CBPR provides a
framework for engaging community members in research and has been effectively applied to a number of
environmental health problems. CBPR goes beyond just sharing research results with community
members to creating meaningful opportunities for community participation in all stages of research (i.e.,
project scoping, data collection, analysis and dissemination). CBPR principles should be embraced in
designing and conducting studies on environmental and health impacts of unconventional natural gas
drilling operations so that a range of community perspectives are addressed.”267
The process of involving all stakeholders (e.g., individuals, communities, advocacy groups,
industry, decision-makers) “fosters multi-directional communication and accountability” and should be
engaged in early on.268
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Under the CBRP process, study results are disseminated to communities in a timely manner.269
As such, a “Community First Communication Model,” which shares research findings with the affected
community before publishing them in scientific literature as a way to empower the community by
reducing information disparities, is recommended. Communities should be engaged in determining the
most effective ways to disseminate research findings and there should be timely and transparent
dissemination and access to aggregated data.”270
Expand social investment
Social investment, as defined by the IPIECA, represents “voluntary contributions companies make to the
communities and broader societies where they operate, with the objective of benefiting external
stakeholders, typically through the transfer of skills or resources.”271
The IPIECA and the Society of Professional Engineers have recently combined efforts to raise the
profile of social investment by oil and gas firms. “Over recent years, energy companies have worked to
expand traditional philosophy into approaches that more explicitly address risk management, social
license, and shared value objectives,” the IPIECA and SPE have said. In 2014 they sponsored a webinar
to “explore this evolution as well as discuss some of the major success factors and challenges associated
with determining social investment priorities, managing design and implementation requirements,
assessing social investment performance, and reporting on impacts.”272
It is worth noting that social investment is different from community engagement. According to
IPIECA, “Community engagement focuses on maintaining positive relations between the company and its
local stakeholders on a day-to-day level, whereas social investment aims to have a positive impact on the
sustained well-being of stakeholders. They require different, but complementary, strategies and
approaches.”273
Finally, IPIECA provides cautionary advice about who provides the social investment program:
“[If] a company engages with a community only through [a social investment] program implemented by a
partner, and lacks having a ‘face’ in the community, it invites the risk that any credit will go to the
implementing partner, while blame will still come back to the company.”274
Corporate philanthropy expert Bruce DeBoskey has advised that “Successful companies now
recognize that philanthropy is a key component of corporate citizenship and business strategy. Too often,
corporate philanthropy is random and uncoordinated. To be truly effective, it must be strategic.”275
Improve water stewardship
The process of hydraulic fracturing entails the use of large quantities of water. In addition, one of the
most prominent concerns of communities where unconventional development takes place is the matter of
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water pollution. However, the amount of water used “can be less important than how stakeholders
perceive [a company’s] withdrawal and consumption patterns.”276
Consequently, a key element in the effort to establish and maintain a social license to operate
involves water stewardship. “Most companies realize that much of their social license to operate hinges
on their prudent management of water in terms of both quality and quanity,” a leading non-governmental
organization has suggested.277 Moreover, “By getting ahead of the curve on water stewardship, the oil and
gas industry has an opportunity to avoid conflicts over water usage before they become acute as well as to
improve its image as a whole,” according to a Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions study.278
Water stewardship programs should take into consideration three water-related risks: regulatory,
physical, and reputational (which is based on stakeholder perceptions about a company’s pattern of
withdrawals and consumption).279According to the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions the programs,
which should span the entire company, will “often consider how water competition could affect business
operations, brand value, and the social license to operate, along with analyzing the potential implications
of upstream and downstream activities upon water quality, withdrawal and consumption.”280
Overall use of water should be reduced and wherever possible, recycled water should be used
while bearing in mind any associated increased risks associated with storage and or transport.281
There are related reporting practices that should be considered. For example, in addition to
increasing water monitoring the reporting on water quality monitoring practices should be undertaken.282
Furthermore, as the use of water is more closely managed and efficiency increased, the metrics on
improved efficiency should be provided to all interested stakeholders.283 Industry may also want to
consider supporting efforts such as Colorado Water Watch (CWW),284 which is “a real-time groundwater
monitoring pilot project” developed by Colorado State University and the Center for Energy and Water
Sustainability. CWW includes a network of sensors “capable of detecting changes in groundwater quality
due to natural or operation impacts. The data is monitored, gathered, analyzed and reported by CWW and
posted to [a] website to provide information to communities in the [Denver Julesburg] Basin.”285
Discharging processed water or effluents to treatment facilities “not only reduces pollution, but
can also lower the organization’s financial costs and the risk of regulatory action for noncompliance…All of this enhances the …organization’s social license to operate.”286
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Finally, the adoption of well integrity practices should be of paramount concern so as to ensure
the adequacy of casing and cement.287
Improved “risk communication” and managing “outrage”
It has been suggested “When it comes to communicating environmental risk, business needs to recognize
that outrage is as important as hazard.”288 Acknowledging “outrage” is fundamental to improving risk
communication, according to Peter Sandman, the leading U.S. expert on environmental risk
communication and managing public outrage.289 According to Mr. Sandman, “When people are outraged,
they tend to think the hazard is more serious that it is…Trying to convince them that it’s not is unlikely to
do much good until you reduce the outrage.”290
Mr. Sandman, who has also been called a “crisis communications expert,”291 has given
considerable thought to the challenges companies face when communicating about fracking, particularly
the relationship between some of the public’s outrage, on the one hand, with the real nature of the hazard
it may present on the other. He begins by placing considerable weight on how the underlying issues are
“framed.”
“[F]raming the controversy – economic pluses versus environmental minuses – is arguably part of
the risk communication problem. That’s certainly the way most fracking proponents and opponents see
the controversy, and the way most media stories report it: as a classic jobs-versus-environment battle,”
Mr. Sandman has said.292 In contrast, he argues that people need to acknowledge that there are pluses and
minuses on both sides of the equation, a development that “would force us all to grapple with the
tradeoffs.”293
Framing, according to Mr. Sandman, who founded the Environmental Communication Research
Department at Rutgers University in the U.S. state of New Jersey, is a “universal psychological
phenomenon…It is characteristic of nearly all risk-versus-benefit controversies. Once people decide a
technology is unacceptably risky, they tend to ignore or disparage its benefits, rather than regretting that
the risks make those benefits sadly unattainable. Similarly, once people decide a technology is too good to
pass up, they tend to ignore or disparage its risks, rather than claiming that the risks are real but the
benefits make those risks worth taking.”294
Bearing this challenge in mind, Mr. Sandman has compiled a list of recommendations for how
companies can address the risk communication challenges related to fracking:295
 Before work begins, offer well water testing.
 Quit referring to “education” as if it is the only impediment between a person’s acceptance of the
process. “Few things are more guaranteed to arouse stakeholders’ outrage than telling them that
287
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they’re ignorant and would be on your side for sure if they just understood the facts. Fracking
industry spokespeople…need to learn that the fracking debate is about values at least as much as
facts.”
Early attention should be given to individual complaints.
“Take a stand against corporate bad actors…It’s probably too much to expect for a fracking
company to blow the whistle on another fracking company…But after others have identified the
bad actors, is it too much to expect for the rest of the industry to take the information onboard?”
Avoid development in locations that are special to a community. “[P]utting a drilling pad near a
grade school is courting outrage. So is putting a drill pad near a much-loved park, or putting one
where it will ruin a cherished viewscape.”
“Acknowledge the history of fracking misbehavior…A company or industry that expects to be
forgiven for what it has done in the past must own up to it first – not just once but often; not just
factually but with visible contrition; not just when your critics raise the issue, but proactively,
raising it yourself until your critics are sick of hearing about it.”

The cost of implementing these recommendations might increase the business costs, Mr. Sandman
admits. “But at least in the developed world, the cost of outrage is now higher than the cost of outrage
management. An industry that can’t afford to ameliorate stakeholders’ outrage without going out of
business is going to go out of business anyway,” he argues.296 “However belatedly, the industry is coming
to realize that anti-fracking stakeholder outrage poses an existential threat. Figuring out how best to
ameliorate that threat should be – and I think will be – a top industry priority for the foreseeable future.
The industry can’t succeed without improved environmental performance. But it can’t succeed without
improved risk communication either,” he suggests.297
Become a “social purpose leader”
Taking a leadership role on an important social issue – i.e., becoming a “social purpose leader” – may
broadly help a firm establish and/or maintain a social license to operate.298 The Canadian and Latin
American-based firm Impakt helps companies identify a social purpose. Impakt recommends
development of a statement of corporate social purpose in the form of “an articulation of the corporation’s
social purpose that captures what the company stands for, what social issue is most aligned with who the
company is and what it does and how social initiatives will contribute to measurable business objectives
and meaningful social change.”299 This statement can function as “a key strategic and communications
asset that helps to establish program priorities and to support communications,” Impakt says.
Acknowledge climate change and efforts to address it
Acknowledging that climate change is taking place, and the need to take action to address the change, can
help the gas industry build trust among its many stakeholders.300 In this regard, Shell has been “increasing
transparency and engagement on emissions and climate change.”301

296

Id.
Id.
298
Paul Klein, Three Ways to Secure your Social License to Operate in 2013, THE CSR BLOG (Dec. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/12/28/three-ways-to-secure-your-social-license-to-operate-in2013/.
299
Statement of Corporate Social Purpose, IMPAKT, http://impaktcorp.com/statement-of-corporate-social-purpose.
300
CNEE Powering Forward Full Report, supra note 9, at 92.
301
Andrea Vittorio, In Rare Move, Shell Tells Shareholders to Back Proposal on Climate Risk Reporting,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 29, 2015).
297

35 | S o c i a l L i c e n s e t o O p e r a t e : F r a c t u r i n g a n d O i l & G a s

As a part of this effort, companies can highlight that the increased usage of gas to power
electricity generation has two fundamental benefits. First, it reduces the total amount of carbon released
as gas begins to displace coal-fired electricity generation.302 And second, “Natural gas can be dispatched
flexibly. The quick ramping ability of natural gas generators makes them ideal for complementing
variable renewable generation.”303
A final observation about climate change involves the notion that if oil and gas companies are, in
the final analysis, involved in the energy business, then it may make sense to hedge some percentage of a
firm’s assets by investing in renewable energy. On the one hand, this will demonstrate climate change
sensitivity to stakeholders concerned about the issue while on the other hand reassuring investor groups
that the company is positioning itself to deal with a more carbon-constrained world.304
Measuring social license to operate efforts
Measuring success, or lack thereof, in relation to social license to operate efforts is not an easy task. A
group of Australian researchers has said, “The social licence to operate is inherently difficult to
quantify.”305 However, considerable benefit can be achieved by a company that can evaluate the social
license issues and assess the efforts that may be required to reduce any socio-political risk “to an
acceptable level.”306
While efforts to measure social license to operate are new, there are indications that it can be
done with the appropriate expertise. Kieren Moffat, senior fellow at the Centre for Social Responsibility
in Mining at the University of Queensland307 and colleague Airong Zhang have recently written (in the
context of the mining industry) that social license “can be quantitatively measured and modeled using
sophisticated social science methods and analytical techniques. This allows for consistent and robust
benchmarking of social performance across time as an operation develops.”308
At least one research project has identified questions that may be useful in trying to measure
social license to operate.309
Other ideas
Among other ideas, which should all be part of a Social License to Operate Report, to bear in mind in
relation to social license to operate:
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Paying above the minimum “can be one factor in building strong community relations, employee
loyalty, and strengthening an organization’s social license to operate. This [becomes] most
relevant for organizations in which a substantial portion of their workforce is compensated in a
manner or scale that is closely linked to laws or regulations on minimum wages.”310
Sourcing from local suppliers will demonstrate “positive local economic impacts. Local sourcing
can be a strategy to help ensure supply, [support] a stable local economy…The proportion of
local spending can also be an important factor in contributing to the local economy and
maintaining community relations.”311
Providing training, education, and counseling to workers and members of the community about
serious disease particularly where work is taking place in areas with a greater communicable
disease incidence. In this regard, “Preventing serious diseases contributes to the health,
satisfaction, and stability of the workforce, and helps maintain the organization’s social license to
operate in a community or region.”312
Investing in renewable energy companies and projects, and using renewable energy where
possible in operations.313

IV. Looking Ahead
IN GENERAL
What is often missing from the discussion about social license to operate in the oil and gas industry’s
unconventional development work is an entity or institution that can convene all parties to a dispute. In
the absence of such a body, the various sides to the dispute typically line up on opposite sides and then
the skirmish ensues in the middle. The result is all too often underscored by bitterness, contention, and
polarization. In many such instances, no party really wins. Moreover, what is left is a legacy of distrust
combined with bitterness. But it does not necessarily have to be this way, particularly if companies and
their stakeholders have somewhere else to go to consider and ultimately reconcile their differences.
Looking back at the history of the international mining community in the 1990s, the
establishment of the Minerals, Mining, and Sustainable Development (MMSD) effort, and the subsequent
launching of the International Council on Mining and Metals314 provide context in which to consider
where today’s unconventional developers find themselves. Of course the mining and metals industry is
not identical to the unconventional oil and gas development industry, but there are lessons from the
mining industry that may be useful. Jim Cooney provides greater context in this regard. Referring to the
MMSD effort as well as a Canadian-based Whitehorse Mining Initiative,315 Mr. Cooney has said, “These
two initiatives propelled the mining industry forward towards a new way of doing business, of relating to
critics, of engaging with stakeholders, and of understanding the role and responsibility of mining.”316 A
group of leading companies had “decided to move out of their defensive posture and engage their critics
in a comprehensive dialogue in search of common good,” he says.317
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While the parallels are not exact, this is clearly a time that the unconventional oil and gas
development industry – and their stakeholders as well – must consider a paradigm shift just as the
international mining industry did around 2000. It will, of course, not be without much questioning and
even derision from those who are wedded to the past. But an alternative to today’s approach must be
conceived by respected and open-minded individuals and organizations.
THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY
What is envisioned is the establishment of a new entity (or set of entities as the case may be) that will
have as its mission to launch an organization to serve as a neutral venue where all parties can gather to
explore their points of view, including those on which they agree as well as disagree. The Center for
Social License to Operate in the Oil & Gas Industry (the Center) will provide a safe and inclusive place to
gather on an on-going basis.






The Center will preferably bring (or develop over six to 12 months) these attributes:
Located within a research university of indisputable integrity.
Have links to research universities in the area (e.g., the region or state) that focus on all of the
many disciplines involved with unconventional development near people, including business,
engineering, environmental science, law, health and so on.
Be headed by an individual of great distinction both in an academic and business sense.
Be advised by a board of directors318 that reflects the wide range of stakeholders interested in this
subject, including, but not limited to businesses, communities, economic developers,
environmental groups, health and safety professionals, and oil and gas representatives.
Have initial funding provided by foundations or other organization that are not connected to the
oil and gas industry.

The Center’s work will, among other things, consist of:
 Gathering the stakeholders together on a regular basis.
 Helping the stakeholders identify shared goals, as a beginning step.
 Publishing, where appropriate, stakeholder-agreed guidelines for social license to operate best
practices.
 Sponsoring community seminars where the work of the Center can be explained and ideas
solicited.
 Working with educational institutions on preparing curricula for key types of professionals (e.g.,
business people, conveners, engineers, lawyers) that will integrate best practice thinking into the
various disciplines as well as encourage cross-disciplinary teaching as a way to “break down
walls” between the various key professionals.
 Working with the media to provide more context to coverage of the underlying issues.
The Center’s work plan
The Center’s work plan will include the following:
 Convening stakeholders319 who pledge a “good faith effort” to work to form consensus-based
SLO guidelines.
318

It would be preferable that members of the board not see their role as to simply represent the narrow interests of
their own group, but rather agree to work for “the good of the whole.”
319
In the context of the MMSD project, the Scoping Report said a critical aspect of the project would be to achieve
key stakeholders’ early involvement and establishing a work approach focused on building a partnership. Having
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Initially conducting a “scoping exercise” with a small group of stakeholders to establish the
process for collaboration.
Undertaking dialogue that includes pinpointing the key issues, considering aspects of agreement
and disagreement about the key issues, agreeing to continue to talk on an on-going basis.
Working towards consensus agreements on planning and operating guidelines
Establishing an auditing system against which company (voluntary) performance can be judged.
Certifying auditors.
Publishing audit reports freely available to all.

Developing knowledge in a “shared” environment
A key element of the Center’s function will be commissioning independent research on current and future
issues that are critical to building consensus decisions and community trust. Among the initial research
projects might be:
Analyzing local community benefits and costs
An important step in achieving sustainability and the social acceptance of communities where
development takes place involves how to “maximize the net benefits.”320 This is particularly the case for
what can be called “boom town” communities, which flourish when development is taking place but
suffer when it slows or disappears.321
In this regard, better understanding the environmental risks associated with unconventional
development will need continuing attention. “Because the scale of shale gas development has increased so
quickly, the research community is playing catch-up in terms of understanding how large the
environmental risks of…development might be,” according to Resources for the Future.322 Among the
important sub-issues to be studied include:
 How significant are water quantity and water quality risks? What are the best options to manage
these risks, particularly in areas of water scarcity?323
 What is the frequency and extent of impacts to groundwater?324
 What is the impact of “habitat fragmentation” associated with unconventional development?325
 How can biodiversity and habitat impacts be lessened?326

stakeholders “inside the project” would be critical “to better [defining] the issues at stake, [and] also to [ensuring]
that the results have credibility and weight.” Luke Danielson, Architecture for Change: An Account of the Mining,
Minerals and Sustainable Development Project - History, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE 43 (2006).
320
Alan J. Krupnick, Managing the Risks of Shale Gas: Key Findings and Further Research, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE 1 (June 2013), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-managingrisksofshalegaskeyfindings.pdf.
321
Id.
322
Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution: Critical Questions for a Sustainable Energy Future,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 19 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-RptNaturalGasRevolution.pdf.
323
Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 19.
324
Id. at 20.
325
Id.
326
Id. Reputational damage may result if there is a “failure to adequately manage such impacts” and this may
contribute to a loss of social license to operate. Sustainability Reporting Guidelines & Oil and Gas Sector
Supplement, supra note 231, at 19.
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Meanwhile, the social impact of a company’s activities also needs more study. It has been noted that in
the mining context economic and environmental impacts have been closely monitored, but not so for
social impacts.327 This is quite likely the case for unconventional development as well, and should be
addressed by the Center.
Understanding public health impacts
To date, the identification and tracking of health impacts has generally been limited due to a lack of
data.328 However, “Health impacts and stressors are perceived to exist in communities with
unconventional natural gas drilling operations. Given that elements of a property owner’s control may
cease once [drilling] begins, these perceptions are consistent with an involuntary risk model, based on a
lack of control of an unknown hazard with little opportunity for independent verification of safety.”329
Consequently, to what degree has public health, including physical and mental, been impacted by
unconventional development?330 Health researchers have increasingly noted “that having a better
understanding of the relationship between energy development and health outcomes, including social
support, life satisfaction, and mental health issues…is critical to developing and implementing
intervention programs design to prevent and/or treat negative health outcomes.”331
Evaluating seismic activity
Seismic impacts have received considerable media attention,332 but more research needs to be undertaken.
“Felt seismicity induced by hydraulic fracturing is very rare,”333 according to a recent article in the
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. Moreover, a leading think-tank has said, “[T]he
academic literature strongly leans towards the view that seismic impacts from fracking per se are trivial.
[However], impacts from liquid waste injection into Class II wells are of greater concern.”334
With those ideas in mind, what is the relationship between fracking operations, including water
disposal, and seismic activity? If a relationship is established, what strategies are available to mitigate the
impact?
Analyzing the loss of public trust

327

Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 43.
Trevor M. Penning, et. al., Environmental Health Research Recommendations from the Inter-Environmental
Health Sciences Core Center Working Group on Unconventional Natural Gas Drilling Operations, ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES 13-14 (Jul. 18, 2014), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wpcontent/uploads/advpub/2014/7/ehp.1408207.pdf.
329
Id.
330
Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 21.
331
Jeffrey B. Jacquet, Review of Risks to Communities from Shale Energy Development, 48 ENVTL. SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY 8321, 8328 (2014).
332
Max Ehrenfreund, Massive spike in Oklahoma earthquakes may be due to fracking, THE WASHINGTON POST
WONKBLOG, (Jan. 7, 2015), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/06/wonkbook-massive-spike-in-okla-earthquakesmay-be-due-to-fracking/.
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Robert J. Skoumal, Michael R. Brudzinski, & Brian S. Currie, Earthquakes Induced by Hydraulic Fracturing in
Poland Township, Ohio, 105 BULLETIN OF THE SEISMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 189 (Feb. 2015).
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Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 22.
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A major stumbling block to unconventional development is often attributable to the lack of trust the
public holds in the institutional foundations of government and the oil and gas industry.335 Professor
Jeffrey B. Jacquet, an expert on the sociology of rural development, has written, “Trust…is becoming of
increasing importance in shale gas communities, as new research shows that decreased trust in governing
bodies and officials correlates strongly with increased perception of risks, increased stress, and increased
reportage of physical and mental health problems.”336
Thus, the underlying questions: How pervasive is the loss? Can it be re-established? If so, how?
Tracking and evaluating public response
Tracking the public’s response to the development of unconventional energy is important. What does
longitudinal research337 indicate regarding public response? Does it change over time and through various
market cycles? To make such research of more use to environmental and rural sociologists, in addition to
policy makers, “it must also be situated within the study of other sociological phenomena such as natural
resource conflicts, ecological modernization, risk perspective, the treadmill of production [and]
technological disasters.”338
Measuring social license to operate
Measurement protocols for social license to operate in the oil and gas industry need further attention,
including how they can be fine-tuned for use at different local and regional levels. Of particular
importance is developing sophisticated (but flexible) schemes to better ascertain “perceptions of
economic legitimacy and social legitimacy.”339
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Id. at 23.
Jeffrey B. Jacquet, supra note 333, at 8324.
337
Longitudinal research involves collecting and analyzing data over a period of time. This research method is
essential in the measurement of social change. Social Research Update – Longitudinal Research in the Social
Sciences, UNIVERSITY OF SURREY, ENGLAND, http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU28.html.
338
Anthony E. Ladd, Stakeholder Perceptions of Socioenvironmental Impacts From Unconventional Natural Gas
Development and Hydraulic Fracturing in the Haynesville Shale, 28 JOURNAL OF RURAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 56, 83
(2013).
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companies contribute to their wellbeing, share their values, and are generally trustworthy. As a result, oil and gas
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As the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation has asserted,
“Measuring and modeling social licence….shows industry where to invest to develop genuine, trust based
relationships with community stakeholders.”340
Auditing systems to confirm company performance against SLO guidelines, thus leading to certification
For the public to develop trust in a company’s performance against SLO guidelines, a fair and transparent
auditing scheme must be established. In this regard, Resolve,341 a Washington, D.C.-based independent
nonprofit organization, has written,
A concerted research effort is needed to bridge significant gaps in knowledge about the
impacts of standards and certification systems and the conduct under which they are more
or less effective...This effort could include filling gaps in knowledge about the baseline
status of relevant socio-cultural or ecological systems, as well as linking into research on
the relationships between prescribed management practices and outcomes.342
That said, certification systems “remain limited in their ability to compel compliance in the same way as
regulations enforceable by law. Governments continue to play a critical role not only in creating and
enabling environment for certification but in complementing standards with regulations and other
measures that ensure minimum acceptable performance.”343
In rural settings
While a considerable amount of unconventional development is taking place in more urban and suburban
settings than ever before, there continues to be development in rural settings. Dr. Tom Measham,344 an
Australian-based expert on the sustainability of rural communities, has noted, “One substantial economic
change which has developed over the past decade, and which has significant impacts for rural areas with a
history of agriculture, is a new industry in the form of unconventional natural gas.”345 In this regard, he
has said, “Unconventional gas posed different impacts on rural communities compared with other forms
of resource extraction. In particular, the imprint of unconventional gas is extensive rather than
intensive…This has the effect of thrusting different and potentially competing industries together in the
same parcel of land. This can generate new types of conflicts, and potential benefits.”346
Consequently, unconventional development in rural areas needs to be studied bearing in mind the
different types of issues that might well be important in a rural setting (e.g., how to address the
demographic phenomenon of large numbers of young men being concentrated in the development area347
340
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Decline, 36 JOURNAL OF RURAL STUDIES 376 (2014).
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This situation “has been historically linked to particular types of social impacts such as alcoholism, sexually
transmitted diseases and violence, with the effect of discouraging young women from staying in the affected
communities and contributing to underlying rural decline.” Id. at 379.
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and how unconventional gas development influences “the three core components of rural decline, namely
rural out-migration, education attainment, and poverty reduction”348).
What is the impact of media coverage on public perception?
An informed media can provide better and more complete coverage of issues. That said, today’s media
coverage of unconventional development needs to be improved if the larger audience of readers is going
to understand what is going on. Research needs to be undertaken on how the media covers the issue and
what impact that has on public perception. This project should likely be undertaken in conjunction with a
well-respected school of journalism or media communications.
The transfer and/or capture of wealth
More research needs to be undertaken about the impact of shale development on both community and
individual wealth. The primary question to be considered is “the degree to and ways in which royalties to
landowners can serve to mitigate the long-term community-level problems” associated with boomtowns
and the resource curse.349 For example, “What happens…when farmer-landowners receive mineral
wealth? Are they more likely to invest in farm operations or consumer spending? To stay on the land or
move elsewhere?”350
Consideration of this set of questions might inform initiatives focused on “capturing the wealth at
the local level,” if that was so desired.351
Understanding the impacts of community-level stigma and how to address it
Communities where shale gas development is taking place may be stigmatized as a result of the
perception of environmental contamination.352 The concept of stigma involves “labeling and
categorization…based on perceived negative and disgraceful attributes.”353
As a consequence, there are several questions that need further study:
To what degree might a community be stigmatized by shale development?
Will communities where shale development is taking place experience “adverse effects on
population growth and investment?”354
 In the event of occurrence of adverse effects, “will it primarily affect certain types of
investment, such as amenity-led development?”355
 “Are shale energy contaminants likely to lead to ‘brownfield’-type remediation and associated
challenges, or will the actual and perceived contamination…result in [a] novel kind of
remediation context?”356



How can a positive SLO be taken account of in an M&A context
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Mergers and acquisitions attorneys have long understood the importance of factoring in “political risk” in
situations where major oil companies purchase assets from exploration firms. To the extent that political
risk also embodies social license to operate, this suggests “that the absence of social license is already
integrated to some extent into the process.”357 On the other hand, the value of having a social license to
operate in place has not attracted as much attention. Consequently, research needs to be undertaken on
how to value a positive social license, including how to reflect the value in a transactional agreement.
Final thoughts about the Center
Currently, there is no institution or entity that closely parallels the Center described above. However, the
benefit of having such an organization becomes evident when one takes into consideration what has been
said about a somewhat similar entity, the Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD):
“[I]nitiatives like the CSSD have a long way to go before they can claim to be genuinely influential. But
the rewards for improving public trust are obvious.”358

V. Conclusion
The 2012 International Energy Association publication Are we Entering a Golden Age of Gas Special
Report acknowledged what many thought – and continue to think – about the future of gas. In short, “The
future for natural gas is bright.”359 One reason for this assessment was the North American shale boom.
And yet, despite the optimism associated with the report’s findings, IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol
offered a cautionary tale about the unconventional development industry. “If this new industry is to
prosper, it needs to earn and maintain its social license to operate,” he warned.360
However, three years on from that advice the picture that emerges seems very hazy at best. It is
undeniable that some things have changed. But that observation may well be illusory in the context of the
growing challenges that industry faces. In particular, approaches continuing to be framed in legal clashes
as a means of ensuring the future development of unconventional oil and gas assets represent a very risky,
and ultimately disconcerting, way for the oil and gas industry, society generally, and communities in
particular to address their differences.
Bearing in mind the highly emotional and deeply entrenched perspectives associated with
hydraulic fracturing, “heading to court for an injunction or similar legal decision in favor of the company
in order to overcome local community opposition…is most unlikely to resolve the situation to anyone’s
satisfaction. It is, in fact, much more likely to create frustration and resentment within the
community…and a shift from latent to overt conflict.”361 Moreover, the industry risks hydraulic fracturing
bans by voter initiative as demonstrated in the heart of oil country – Denton, Texas – in 2014,362 a result
that was described as something “many never imagined possible.”363 This is hardly a promising scenario
357
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considering that the use of hydraulic fracturing “could develop into one of the most contentious
environmental movements of our time.”364
Thus, and perhaps to the consternation of some who are entirely invested in maintaining the status
quo despite its many limitations, the “letter of the law” approach may not be the best means of addressing
issues that have continually defied legal resolution. This is exactly the context in which alternatives must
be considered, and one that has significant potential is encouraging companies to seek, earn and maintain
a social license to operate.
This is not to suggest that there is not a role for the political or legal license. There definitely is.
“However, both legal and political licenses have limitations and they are increasingly reliant on social
license,” according to John Morrison, an SLO expert.365 Highly-respected environmental law jurist Brian
J. Preston, Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, has described the
relationship between the legal and social licenses in this manner:
The law may encapsulate society’s expectations to a greater or lesser degree. To the extent that
the law does so, the business can be viewed as having a legal licence to use land and its resources.
The legal licence sets the formal framework for obtaining and maintaining the right to use land
and its resources and for imposing and enforcing the responsibilities and accountability for the
exercise of that right. To the extent that the law does not do so, the business needs to rely on the
notion of a social licence. A social licence describes the latitude or freedom that society allows
the business to use land and its resources without interference. Society expects more of
businesses than that they just comply with the law.366
Bruce Harvey, a former Rio Tinto executive and now an adjunct professor at the Center for Responsibility
and Mining at the University of Queensland, has made this observation:
If we think about what’s happened in the world in the last 50 years, previously the resource sector
secured its license to operate at the discretion of government. In fact, we still do. And that’s
called a legal license and permits and license are granted and we lived up to the expectation and
they are maintained. But in the world of globalization and in an increasing world of scrutiny and
mobilization of local voices, if you don’t have the broad based support of local people for what
you want to do, then you won’t get your legal license.367
Understanding how to establish a social license to operate and then maintain it is admittedly not an easy
task, but it is not impossible.368 A leading international global risk consultant has said that achieving
social license “is time consuming and resource intensive. Everyone in a company has a role to play to
gauge changing sentiment and emerging issues, to continuously communicate with stakeholders at all
levels and to capture the need for changing strategies when they emerge.”369
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However, at the outset perhaps the key factor that will underscore whether it proceeds or not lies
in the hands of oil and gas developers. And like it or not, the industry is facing, in effect, a “social
process” revolving around the acceptance of fracking that it not wholly within its control. No business
willing gives up control over any aspect of its operations, but at a minimum the oil and gas industry must
acknowledge that it cannot determine the outcome on its own. Canadian resources dispute expert Ian
Thomson has encapsulated the situation in which the industry finds itself: “Given the speed and power
with which social process can operate, it falls to the operating company to be proactive in understanding
the local community, its hopes, fears and social structure, and develop a process of communication,
consultation, and sharing that brings the various players together rather than polarizing positions and
driving them apart.”370
The establishment of a series of Centers for the Social License to Develop in the Oil and Gas
Industry may represent an important step in defining and deploying social license to operate. By
assembling the parties in a neutral forum, it will aim to replace contention with consensus, and animosity
with partnership. And, as a key part of the Center’s work, energy and resources must be invested in
developing “shared knowledge” where all of the participants play a role in defining the issues to be
considered.
In short, “The ingenuity and tenacity of the oil industry fueled the shale revolution. Now, the
same ingenuity and tenacity is needed to safeguard and ensure that this newfound energy abundance is
lasting.”371 In today’s environment, this is particularly important because when the process of establishing
and maintaining a social license to operate is done well, the risk of disruption is minimized and the
opportunity of business success is maximized.
Former U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, no stranger to facing enormous challenges and
succeeding, once remarked, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the
opportunity in every difficulty.” Despite the challenges that lie ahead, we definitely remain optimists.
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